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Abstract The relationship between public international law and multinational
enterprises (MNEs) has over the last decades emerged as one of the most hotly
debated topics in theory and practice. Arguments have often been voiced for the
creation of international law obligations binding on MNEs. Such obligations may
serve as a deterrent to corporate conduct with nefarious consequences for the en-
joyment by individuals of their human rights and the environment. The current
article approaches the state-MNE relationship through the analytical lens of ‘shared
responsibility under international law’. Thus, it assesses whether the current system
of international responsibility rules provides the necessary tools to allocate re-
sponsibility between states and MNEs in situations where these actors contribute to
harmful outcomes proscribed by international law. Second, it will turn to the po-
tential pathways for the implementation of such responsibility on an international
and domestic level. Finally, the article will provide an overview of the key standard-
setting initiatives undertaken within the framework of the United Nations in relation
to the conduct of MNEs. Ultimately, the international legal system allows for
various conceptualisations of the ‘shared responsibility’ between states and MNEs,
which operate in parallel towards the closing of the perceived ‘accountability gap’
associated with the conduct of MNEs.
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1 Introduction
The rise of the multinational enterprise, and the perceived threat it posed to newly
independent and, more generally, developing states generated considerable concern
among international lawyers throughout the second half of the twentieth century, as
this new type of corporation was considered capable of undermining those states’
sovereignty. So much can be gleaned from Judge Padilla Nervo’s polemical
Separate Opinion in Barcelona Traction, wherein he stated that:
It is not the shareholders in those huge corporations who are in need of
diplomatic protection; it is rather the poorer or weaker States, where the
investments take place, who need to be protected against encroachment by
powerful financial groups, or against unwarranted diplomatic pressure from
governments who appear to be always ready to back at any rate their
national shareholders, even when they are legally obliged to share the risk
of their corporation and follow its fate … Perhaps modern international
business practice has a tendency to be soft and partial towards the
powerful and the rich, but no rule of law could be built on such flimsy
bases.1
A similar point was made in a Report prepared by the Department of Economic
and Social Affairs of the United Nations (UN) in 1973. The Report noted that
‘[g]overnments often feel a lack of power to deal effectively with powerful
multinational corporations’.2
The common thread running through these statements is the increasing power of
multinational enterprises (MNEs), which was perceived as antagonistic to that of
sovereign states. Indeed, in the years to follow, those not enamoured of MNEs
would often compare the economic power of the latter to that of developing states,
highlighting the growing disparity between the two.3 The assumption was that
MNEs, with support from their home states, would bring their economic power to
bear upon developing states, in which they operated, in order to circumvent national
regulation in furtherance of their profit.
From the 1970s onwards, discussions on MNEs became a staple fixture on the
UN agenda. Amidst calls for a ‘New International Economic Order’, views on the
beneficial or destructive role of MNEs ‘were held with religious fervour and
1 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Second Phase, ICJ Reports
1970, p. 3 (Barcelona Traction), pp. 248, 250 (Judge Padilla Nervo, Separate Opinion).
2 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, ‘Multinational Corporations in World Development’,
UN Doc. ST/ECA/190 (1973), p. 43.
3 One should here note that Seidl-Hohenveldern had cautioned against these comparisons suggesting that
‘economic power is also not necessarily equated with political power. From a formalistic point of view,
even the weakest State disposes of legislative and police powers, which even the strongest multinational
enterprise does not possess as its own.’ Seidl-Hohenveldern (1986), p. 35 (emphasis in the original).
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certainty, and led to evangelical prescriptions’.4 As a result, discussions on the
regulation of MNEs on an international level became bogged down. Eventually,
after the mid-1980s, the controversy started to subside, as developing states became
more keen on luring foreign direct investment.
Nonetheless, ever since the end of the Cold War, MNEs have once more
appeared on the radar of international lawyers and such appearance is owed to a
string of inter-related socio-economic phenomena with significant political ramifi-
cations. First, the onset of the elusive—in definitional terms—globalisation5 has
essentially contributed to a ‘denationalisation’6 of economic and social activities,
evidenced by the increase in cross-border capital and technology mobility, as well
as in societal exchanges. From a legal point of view, the process of globalisation is
intertwined with the conclusion of global and regional trade agreements, whose
main thrust is the liberalisation of investment. Overall, international trade law has
created a permissive and protective legal and regulatory environment for MNEs.7
The renewed concern with the operations of MNEs is further related to the trend
towards privatisation. States have been delegating their functions to corporate
entities, which in turn are entrusted with the running of hospitals and prisons, the
supply of energy, and the provision of security services. MNEs ‘have entered what
used to be in many countries ‘‘reserved’’ state businesses in the ‘‘public service’’
fields’.8 Privatisation thus has a double-edged effect. On the one hand, MNEs
discharging public functions emerge as ‘new fragmented centres of power …
[which means that] the individual now perceives authority, repression and alienation
in a variety of new bodies’.9 On the other hand, MNEs nowadays not only
antagonise sovereign states in economic, but also in functional terms.
Interestingly, the end of the Cold War did not only herald the advent of an era
conducive to the growth of MNEs’ powers, but it also spawned the information
revolution, which has been instrumental in reinvigorating the question of the
regulation of MNEs on an international plane. Voluminous reports now exist,
containing allegations that corporations have knowingly assisted repressive
governments to commit human rights abuses, contributed to extraordinary and
illegal renditions of terrorist suspects, or co-operated with governments to silence
those opposing their projects. MNEs are once more perceived as entities which, due
to their power and complex organisational structure, have the capacity to stand
‘above the law’ and to negatively impact on the enjoyment of individuals’ human
rights and the environment. States are unable—or in some cases unwilling—to
enforce the fundamental rules of the international legal order, when this would
conflict with the interest of the MNEs. According to a candid description offered by
4 Rubin (1995), p. 1276.
5 According to Vagts, globalisation refers to the ‘process through which natural and legal impediments to
the movement of economic elements across national frontiers are being ground away’. See Vagts (2003),
p. 798.
6 Delbrueck (1993), p. 11; von Bogdandy (2004), p. 888.
7 Muchlinski (2007), p. 25.
8 Reinisch (2005), p. 75.
9 Clapham (1993), p. 137.
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Henkin, ‘no sovereign State, and not all state sovereignties together, seem to be
sovereign enough to solve the problems that these developments have brought to our
human society at the end of the twentieth century’.10
In the light of the above, clarion calls have been made to the effect that
international law obligations should be imposed upon MNEs especially in relation
to human rights and the environment. The rationale behind these calls is that
international law is the only potentially efficient means of curbing the nefarious
consequences of the conduct of MNEs. An exhaustive analysis of the merit of
MNEs being directly regulated by international law falls outside the scope of the
present article, and the question has already been debated at length.11 Rather, the
focus will rest on the implication of states and MNEs in harmful outcomes, which
international law seeks to prevent, and the sharing of international responsibility
among them. In other words, the article will examine the operation of MNEs
through the analytical lens of ‘shared responsibility’.12 First, the article will offer a
working definition of the concept of the MNE. Second, it will explore the possibility
of attributing responsibility under positive international law to states, and
potentially to MNEs, for their contribution to harmful outcomes. Third, it will
assess the implementation of ‘shared responsibility’ situations by national and
international courts, with a view to identifying possible merits or pitfalls in the
synergies between the two levels of adjudication. Finally, the viability of UN
standard-setting initiatives concerning MNEs and human rights will be scrutinised
as alternative methods of preventing harmful outcomes.
2 Defining the Multinational Enterprise
Prior to discussing any aspect of the responsibility of MNEs, one should provide
some insight as to what the term ‘multinational enterprise’ actually means. In
his seminal article on the issue, Vagts defined the MNE as ‘a cluster of
corporations of diverse nationality joined by ties of common ownership and
responsive to a common management strategy’.13 A similar definition was
adopted in the Report prepared by the UN Group of Eminent Persons, according
to which ‘multinational corporations’ are ‘enterprises which own or control
production or service facilities outside the country in which they are based.
Such enterprises are not always incorporated or private; they can also be co-
operatives or state-owned entities’.14 Yet, the use of the term ‘multinational
corporation’ created a rift among the UN Economic and Social Council
10 Henkin (1999), p. 6.
11 See generally Jaegers (2002); Alston (2005); Clapham (2006); Zerk (2011); De Jonge (2011); Karavias
(2013).
12 On the concept of ‘shared responsibility’ see Nollkaemper and Jacobs (2013), pp. 360–361;
Nollkaemper (2014b), pp. 6–12.
13 Vagts (1970), p. 740.
14 Report of the UN Group of Eminent Persons, The Impact of Multinational Corporations on
Development and on International Relations, UN Doc. E/5500/Add 1 (Part I) (24 May 1974), reproduced
in 13 ILM 800 (1974), p. 25.
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(ECOSOC) members, with Latin American states arguing that ‘the term
‘‘multinational corporation’’ denotes an enterprise in which a number of States
participate. [The] term for corporations operating beyond their own frontiers is
transnational’.15 Indeed, the United Nations, and more specifically ECOSOC,
eventually embraced the term ‘transnational corporations’.16
The content of the terms ‘multinational enterprise’ and ‘transnational corpora-
tion’ remain contested. The terms have been employed by various authors and
bodies to denote a variety of corporate structures. Ultimately, neither of the two
terms has a fixed meaning in international law, and the use of one over the other
remains a matter of taste. Nonetheless, despite the terminological divergence, one
could infer from the above definitions some of the key characteristics of the
‘multinational enterprise’ from a legal point of view. First and foremost, an MNE
owns and operates assets and controls their use across national frontiers. Essentially,
the MNE will consist of a parent company, which controls a network of legally
discrete subsidiaries, which are in turn incorporated in several countries. Second,
this complex of discrete entities constitutes a single economic unit, responsive to the
managerial direction of a sole decision-making centre.17 According to Muchlinski,
‘the national identity of the various operating companies disappears, even though
such identity continues on a formal level through the requirement of incorporation
under the laws of the various States, in which the MNE operates.’18 The image that
one typically conjures up when speaking of the MNE is that of a ‘pyramid’, namely
of a ‘parent company which owns and controls a network of wholly or majority-
owned subsidiaries, which may themselves be intermediate holdings for sub-groups
of closely held subsidiaries’.19
It is true that the structure of the MNE is far more complex than that of a
corporation domiciled within a single jurisdiction and, therefore, it may be
considered as a form of business organisation, whose regulation on the international
plane merits closer consideration with a view to closing any accountability gaps. At
the same time, one cannot disregard the possibility of a corporation domiciled in a
single state wielding enough power to contribute, in co-operation with that state, to
a harmful outcome prescribed by international law.
15 Statement by the Peruvian Ambassador Jose de la Puente before the UN Group of Eminent Persons,
reproduced in Aramburu´ Menchaca (1976), p. 358. Interestingly, this argument reverberated for years to
come. Rigaux thus wrote: ‘we no longer speak of multinational corporations (or enterprises), as the use of
this adjective gives the mistaken impression that the company or enterprise has national status in various
different countries. The term transnational more correctly refers to a form of autonomy which
corporations with establishments scattered over the territories of several States have been able to acquire
in their relations with each of them.’ See Rigaux (1991), p. 121 (emphasis in the original).
16 See, for example, Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order,
A/RES/S-6/3202 (1 May 1974), section 5; ECOSOC Res. 1913, UN Doc. E/5570/Add.1 (1974).
17 Cf. Fatouros (1971), p. 326.
18 Muchlinski (2007), p. 7.
19 Muchlinski (2007), p. 56. For a detailed analysis of the various configurations of the MNEs’ legal
form, see Muchlinski (2007), pp. 51–78.
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3 Corporations and the Law of International Responsibility20
In accordance with the dominant paradigm under international law, international
responsibility operates on the basis of the fundamental notions of independent
and exclusive responsibility.21 Under the principle of independent responsibility,
a state incurs responsibility ‘for its own conduct’. Intertwined with the principle
of independent responsibility is the principle of exclusive responsibility,
according to which ‘[i]n practice, conduct is commonly attributed to one actor
only’.22
The key legal mechanism, upon which the principle of independent responsibility
is based, is that of attribution of conduct. Attribution serves to identify the conduct,
which can be linked to a state, thus potentially generating its international
responsibility. In the Commentary to the Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), it is stated that:
In theory, the conduct of all human beings, corporations or collectivities
linked to the State by nationality, habitual residence or incorporation might be
attributed to the State, whether or not they have any connection to the
Government. In international law, such an approach is avoided, both with a
view to limiting responsibility to conduct which engages the State as an
organization, and also so as to recognize the autonomy of persons acting on
their own account and not at the instigation of a public authority.23
If the truth be told, corporations do not feature prominently in the codification of
the law of international responsibility. The main reason for this is that they are not
in principle considered to be direct addressees of international law obligations, i.e.
of primary international law norms, and therefore their conduct cannot set in motion
the operation of secondary international law rules. In the words of Crawford and
Olleson, ‘no general regime of responsibility has developed to cover them’.24 Yet,
this does not mean that corporations are excluded from the ambit of the international
responsibility of states in toto. On the contrary, the conduct of corporations is
directly relevant from an international law perspective, when it comes to the
operation of the rules on attribution of conduct. Thus, the conduct of a corporate
entity, albeit private, can be attributed to the state should there exist a requisite link
between the corporation and the state, thus potentially generating that state’s
responsibility. This link manifests itself in various ways. Such a link may be
normative in the sense that a corporation may be ‘empowered by the law of the State
to exercise elements of governmental authority’, and thus corporate conduct may be
attributed to the state, provided the corporation ‘is acting in that capacity in that
20 The present analysis will focus in principle on the international responsibility of states, since it is
with states that MNEs predominantly interact.
21 Nollkaemper and Jacobs (2013), p. 381.
22 Nollkaemper and Jacobs (2013), p. 383.
23 Commentary to the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, ILC
Yearbook 2001/II(2) (ARSIWA Commentary), 38.
24 Crawford and Olleson (2014), p. 445.
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particular instance’.25 Besides, corporate conduct may be attributed to a state if the
corporation ‘is in fact acting on the instruction of, or under the direction or control
of, that State in carrying out the conduct’.26 In the words of the International Law
Commission (ILC), the question of attribution in this respect turns on the existence
of a ‘specific factual relationship between the person or entity engaging in the
conduct and the State’.27
It becomes apparent from the above that the rules on state responsibility do not
turn a blind eye to the operation of private corporations, and what is more, these
rules are actually amenable to corporate conduct. Nonetheless, the operation of
MNEs in particular creates the following conundrum. Host states often enter into
contracts with subsidiaries of MNEs, which are domiciled in the host state. A host
state may then use such a subsidiary as its ‘long arm’ with a view to perpetrating a
violation of its international law obligations. In such a case, the conduct of the
subsidiary may be attributed to the host state. Of course, the subsidiary is not a
freestanding actor. As stated above, its operation is under the managerial control of
the parent company. In other words, the parent company, and by extension the home
state, may be implicated in the commission of an international law violation, which
arises from the conduct of a subsidiary abroad. Thus, one could speak of the ‘shared
responsibility’ of the home and the host state, or even of the host state and the MNE,
for the contribution to a single harmful outcome. The next sub-sections will turn to
the examination of these attribution scenarios with a view to ascertaining whether
they square with existing rules on international responsibility.
3.1 Shared Responsibility of the Home and Host States
The literature on the role of the relationship between home and host states has for
many years departed from the assumption that MNEs are based in developed
countries, whereas their affiliates are incorporated in developing countries. The key
idea behind this assumption is that there exists a disparity in power between the
home and host state, which the MNE will use to its own advantage, mainly to
circumvent national laws. Whereas there may be some truth in this assumption, one
should not overlook the fact that foreign direct investment by MNEs from
developing countries has been increasing incessantly over the last two decades.28 At
the same time, the perceptions on the role of host states have become somewhat
more nuanced, as there have been instances where developing host states have not
only abstained from regulating corporate entities, but where they have actively co-
operated with them in perpetrating human rights abuses.29
25 See Art. 5 of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, ILC Yearbook
2001/II(2) (ARSIWA).
26 See Art. 8 ARSIWA.
27 ARSIWA Commentary, 47 (emphasis added).
28 According to UNCTAD, foreign direct investment by transnational corporations from developing
countries in 2013 reached a record high of USD 545 billion. See UNCTAD, World Investment Report
2014, United Nations Publication, Geneva, p. xiv.
29 For example, in 1998, the ILO Commission of Inquiry examining allegations of forced labour in
Myanmar reached the conclusion that ‘[t]here is substantial evidence before the Commission showing the
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Yet, one should note here that the perceptions as regards the role of the host state
have been shifting. More specifically, international and regional human rights
bodies, in espousing the conception of a ‘horizontal application’ of human rights,
have produced ample case law as regards the positive obligations of states to uphold
human rights in the relationships between individuals and private entities, such as
corporations.30 Thus, a host state that is a party to an international or regional
human rights convention will in principle find itself obliged to regulate corporate
conduct within its jurisdiction under international law.
A number of writers suggest that such obligations of the host state should also be
complemented by corresponding obligations of the home state. The latter should be
held responsible for breaching the obligation to regulate the activity of its corporate
nationals abroad, which flows from the ‘general duty’ of states under international
law ‘not to act in such a way as to cause harm outside [their] territory’.31 This
argument, of course, goes against the grain of the dominant position in international
law, which could be summarised as follows: ‘A subsidiary is a separate legal entity
and therefore necessarily distinct from its parent… as a matter of international law,
parent and subsidiary are each subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their
respective sovereigns. They cannot be identified.’32
The ‘home state obligation’ and the dominant ‘corporate veil’ arguments can
both be qualified. It appears that there is no cogent reason to deduce an obligation of
the home state from a general duty of ‘due diligence’ by way of analogy, especially
when international practice in this respect is lacking. On the contrary, in the single
instance that an international body pierced the ‘corporate veil’, it did so via a
dynamic interpretation of international human rights law—and admittedly using
very subtle language. Thus, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination in its 2012 Concluding Observations regarding Canada noted that
it ‘is concerned that the State Party has not yet adopted measures with regard to
transnational corporations registered in Canada whose activities negatively impact
the rights of indigenous peoples outside Canada, in particular in mining activities’
and it went on to recommend that Canada should ‘take appropriate legislative
measures to prevent transnational corporations registered in Canada from carrying
out activities that negatively impact on the enjoyment of rights of indigenous
peoples in territories outside Canada, and hold them accountable’.33
Footnote 29 continued
pervasive use of forced labour imposed on the civilian population throughout Myanmar by the authorities
and the military … sometimes for the profit of private individuals’. ILO Report of the Commission of
Inquiry appointed under Article 26 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organization to
examine the observance by Myanmar of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), 2 July 1998, para.
528.
30 For an overview of the case law on the positive human rights obligations of states to regulate the
conduct of private corporations, see Karavias (2013), pp. 30–59.
31 McCorquodale and Simmons (2007), p. 617; in the same vein, Sornarajah (2001), p. 505.
32 Mann (1984), p. 56. Cf. de Brabandere (2010), p. 78.
33 CERD, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination—
Canada, UN Doc CERD/C/CAN/CO/19-20 (4 April 2012), p. 4.
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Turning to the question of the responsibility of home and host states, the situation
could be fitted within the corsetry of the existing rules of international responsi-
bility. Thus, the home state—assuming that it bears an international law obligation
to regulate the conduct of its corporate nationals abroad—and the host state would
both independently incur international responsibility for a breach of their respective
obligations of due diligence. In this situation, the two states would act—or fail to act
to be more precise—independently and incur responsibility for different breaches in
respect of the same injury.34 The responsibility in this case only appears to be
‘shared’, in the sense that the failure of two states to act contributes to a single
wrongful outcome, yet in principle such responsibility would rest with the home and
host state separately.
One could envisage a situation, though, where the home and host states would
incur ‘shared responsibility’ for the same wrongful act. This would be the case if the
conduct of a subsidiary were to be attributed both to the host state and the home
state of the MNE. Whilst the question of dual or multiple attribution generated
considerable debate in theory, it is now accepted that the law of international
responsibility does not preclude such a possibility.35 A dual attribution to the home
and host states of the conduct of a subsidiary presupposes the existence of the
requisite normative or factual link, as described above. A normative link would exist
if the home state of an MNE and the host state of a subsidiary of that MNE
established a joint consortium, which contracted with the said subsidiary, while both
states empowered it by virtue of their national legislation to exercise elements of
governmental authority in respect of the operation of the joint consortium.
The dual attribution of the conduct of an MNE subsidiary to the home and host
states on the basis of a factual link presents a different challenge. According to
Article 8 ARSIWA, the subsidiary should be under the instructions, direction or
control of both states. As Messineo has noted, ‘this may seem to imply that
‘‘effective’’ control can be ‘‘effective’’ with relation to more than one subject of
international law at the same time’.36 Still, whereas a higher threshold of factual
control is necessary for control to be considered ‘effective’, no such threshold needs
to be met in respect of ‘instructions’. The rule on ‘instructions’ can lead to multiple
attribution, as it is possible for someone to ‘have received general instructions to
carry out a certain conduct by a state … and then to be under the more specific
‘‘effective’’ control of another state … when carrying out the orders’.37 Of course,
the question of the influence exercised by the home state on the subsidiary operating
in the host state, and whether this amounts to ‘instructions’ in the sense of
international responsibility, is one of the thorniest politically, as well as practically
due to the complex structure of the MNEs. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that the
general formulation of the ARSIWA seems to keep the door ajar for discussions of
the ‘shared responsibility’ of the home and host states.
34 See in this respect the analysis in Crawford (2013), pp. 333–336.
35 See Messineo (2014), p. 62.
36 Messineo (2014), pp. 77–78.
37 Messineo (2014), p. 78.
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3.2 Shared Responsibility between the MNE and the Host State38
The more interesting question is that of attributing responsibility to the host state
and the MNE when they contribute to a single harmful outcome, thus the two
incurring shared responsibility. The first issue to be addressed is the requisite
capacity of a person or entity to incur responsibility under international law.
Furthermore, one has to assess whether the attribution of responsibility to a non-
state actor could take place on the basis of analogies drawn to the existing rules of
responsibility, as codified by the ILC.
State responsibility is based on ‘[o]ne of the principles most deeply rooted in the
doctrine of international law … [namely] that any conduct of a State which
international law classifies as wrongful entails the responsibility of that State in
international law’.39 A justification for this principle is the legal nature of the
obligations that international law imposes on its subjects.40 The system of
international responsibility, as is the case with any given legal order, operates as
a guarantee of its subjects behaving in accordance with the obligations binding on
them.41 Thus, a quintessential requirement of international responsibility is the
existence of a primary international obligation binding upon a person.42
This line of thought was pushed further in the context of the ILC’s codification of
the rules on the international responsibility of international organisations. According
to Gaja, ‘responsibility under international law may arise only for a subject of
international law. Norms of international law cannot impose on an entity primary
obligations or secondary obligations in case of breach of one of the primary
obligations unless that entity has legal personality under international law.
Conversely, an entity has to be regarded as a subject of international law even if
only a single obligation is imposed on it under international law’.43 States and
international organisations have a common trait, namely they both possess
international legal personality, from which flows their capacity to incur international
responsibility. Therefore, it appears only logical to suggest that the fundamental
principles of state responsibility, as codified in Articles 1 and 2 ARSIWA, are
‘easily transposable to international organizations and seem hardly questionable’.44
International personality, then, is seen as a threshold that once met enables
international law to attach responsibility to a given entity. Whether this logic is
38 Of course, responsibility must be allocated to a specific entity. One might argue that the subsidiary
would suffice. However, this would not allay the fears of accountability gaps. Therefore, mention is made
throughout to the MNE, assuming, as explained below, that a specific obligation exists addressed
to the MNE.
39 Ago (1971), p. 205.
40 Ago (1971), p. 205.
41 See Verdross (1964), p. 373; Cottereau (1991), p. 3.
42 Graefrath (1984), p. 21.
43 Gaja G, First Report on responsibility of international organizations, UN Doc. A/CN.4/532 (2003),
p. 110. The circularity of this statement is somewhat evident, but one has to bear in mind that circular
reasoning permeates discussions on international personality as a whole. See the interesting analysis in
Klabbers (2005), p. 35.
44 Gaja 2003, supra n. 43, p. 115.
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helpful in relation to MNEs and—more generally—to private corporations merits
further consideration. In handing down its Reparation for Injuries Advisory
Opinion, which centred on the international legal personality of the United Nations,
the International Court of Justice (the ICJ or the Court) dissociated sovereignty and
subjectivity under international law, thus paving the way for the enlargement of the
circle of international law subjects. As the Court noted: ‘The subjects of law in any
legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of their
rights, and their nature depends upon the needs of the community’.45 Thus,
international law rules ‘may select different entities and endow them with different
legal functions’.46
Turning to private corporations, there is a body of theory that suggests that they do
not possess international legal personality,47 whilst others note that this question
remains an open one.48 Public international law is rather parsimonious as to the
existence of international law obligations binding directly on corporations. Excep-
tionally, though, this may be the case. Thus, it has been argued that corporations
entering into a contract for exploration for polymetallic nodules with the International
Seabed Authority (ISA) incur obligations under international law, since states
themselves have consented to this possibility in the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea (LOSC).49 These corporations, on the basis of this contract, and in accordance
with the respective LOSC provisions, may in turn incur responsibility under
international law for a wrongful act in breach of the contract.50 The international
responsibility of corporations in this respect seems to be following the basic tenets of
the law of international responsibility, namely that the breach by an entity of its
international obligations may engage that entity’s international responsibility.
One might venture even further and suggest that corporations conducting
exploration activities in the Area on the basis of a contract with the ISA may incur
international responsibility because they possess the requisite measure of interna-
tional personality.51 Yet, this personality stems from, and is closely intertwined
with, the life of the contract. If a corporation were to terminate its contract with the
ISA, it would not continue to possess any free-standing measure of international
legal personality. The crux of the matter is that corporations, unlike states and
international organisations, are not presumed to be subjects of international law.
Their personality is exclusively coterminous with the scope of the obligations
imposed upon them by states. Thus, when it comes to corporations, one might agree
with Gaja that they incur responsibility because they are subjects of international
45 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports
1949, p. 174, p. 178.
46 O’Connell (1970), p. 80.
47 Crawford (2012), p. 122; Graf Vitzthum (2010), p. 166; Castell and Derycke (2000), p. 155.
48 Shaw (2008), p. 250; cf. Wouters (2006), p. 109.
49 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, in force 16
November 1994, 1833 UNTS 3 (LOSC). On the international law nature of these obligations, see
Karavias (2013), pp. 136–143.
50 Karavias (2013), pp. 143–148.
51 Cf. Plakokefalos (2013), pp. 396–398.
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law, yet their subjectivity cannot be dissociated or disjointed from their obligations.
Thus, when it comes to entities that are not categorically recognised by international
law as its subjects, it is not their personality or subjectivity, in an abstract and reified
form, that constitutes the root of their capacity to incur international responsibility,
but the fact that they possess a number of international law obligations. To argue for
the recognition of a corporation’s responsibility irrespective of the existence of any
obligation binding upon it would risk throwing open the floodgates to ‘buck-
passing’.
The existence of an international law obligation should therefore form a
necessary condition for the attachment of responsibility under international law,
either under the dominant paradigm or the ‘shared responsibility’ one. Thus, the
shared responsibility of the MNE and the host state for their contribution to a
harmful outcome, such as a human rights abuse, is theoretically conceivable if both
entities are bound by a set of international human rights law rules. An assessment as
to whether such obligations binding on MNEs exist falls outside the scope of the
present article. The following analysis will proceed on the basis of the assumption
that MNEs do have the requisite capacity to incur shared responsibility under
international law.52
MNEs may become implicated in human rights abuses if in some way they
facilitate states’ capacity to commit human rights abuses through the provision of
financial, logistical or technological support.53 Therefore, the first port of call, when
visualising how such shared responsibility is to be allocated to the MNE, is the
responsibility for aiding and abetting another. Aiding and abetting, or complicity, is
a term used both in international and national law and may thus have a variety of
meanings. Since the present analysis is concerned with the question of shared
responsibility in international law, it is only apposite that one approaches such a
question through the analytical tool of responsibility for aiding and abetting as
formulated in the framework of international responsibility.54 This methodology
arguably finds support in the case law of the ICJ, which employed Article 16
ARSIWA as an appropriate tool when assessing the collaboration between Serbia
and the Republika Srpska, a non-state entity. The ICJ held that although Article 16
ARSIWA ‘concerns a situation characterised by a relationship between two States,
[and it] is not directly relevant to the present case, it nevertheless merits
consideration’.55 One could extrapolate from this dictum that the core of aiding and
52 There are a number of scholars who accept that multinational corporations are subject to international
human rights obligations. See Paust (2002), p. 810; Stephens (2002), pp. 75–78.
53 The following section is preoccupied with the situation where the MNE contributes to the commission
of a human rights abuse by a state. This, of course, does not preclude the following two scenarios: (a) the
contribution on behalf of a state to a human rights abuse committed by an MNE and (b) the possible
‘shared responsibility’ of the MNE and the state for separate wrongs, which result in the same harmful
outcome.
54 See Art. 16 ARSIWA and Arts. 14, 58 Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations,
ILC Report on the work of its sixty-third session, UNGAOR 66th Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/66/10
(2011) (ARIO).
55 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia




abetting can be transposed to the relationship between a state and an MNE in order
to gauge the shared responsibility incurred by a state aided by an MNE, but also vice
versa.
The first exercise would be to identify and describe the normative content of the
elements of complicit conduct starting from the material element. The co-operation
between MNEs and states manifests itself in a variety of forms, as infinite as the
possible contractual agreements between the two. Yet, it is doubtful whether all
forms of co-operation can be branded as complicit. Curiously, the ILC Commentary
to Article 16 does not discuss this point. On the contrary, it includes two seemingly
contradictory statements. First, it states that the assistance must be ‘clearly linked’
to the wrongful act, and make a ‘significant’ contribution to it.56 Then it posits that
‘the assistance may only have been an incidental factor in the commission of the
primary act, and may have contributed only to a minor degree, if at all, to the injury
suffered’.57 Indeed, the simultaneous existence of these statements muddies the
waters regarding the requisite causal link between aid or assistance and the wrongful
act. Turning to the analysis offered by the ILC in the context of the responsibility of
international organisations, the ILC underlined that ‘for international responsibility
to arise, aid or assistance should contribute ‘‘significantly’’ to the commission of the
act’.58 Indeed, setting a higher threshold seems to be the better interpretation, since
it appears implausible that responsibility for aiding and assisting should follow from
conduct, which would be only remotely linked to the wrongful act.59
If we were to apply the ‘significant contribution’ test to the relationship between
MNEs and states, it would mean that an MNE would risk incurring responsibility for
aiding and assisting first and foremost where its contribution was a conditio sine qua
non of the commission of the wrongful act. Thus, a state might only be capable of
committing forced evictions on a massive scale if an MNE provides it with the
appropriate construction vehicles used to demolish houses. Equally, an MNE might
provide a state with the necessary mining equipment or know-how in order to enable
it to execute mining operations in blatant disregard of the human rights of the
population living around the mining area. Yet, as stated above, the contribution of
the assisting party need not be essential, but significant. In such a case the human
rights violation would have taken place irrespective of the aid or assistance of the
MNE, nonetheless the latter’s contribution impacted on the manner in which the
violation was committed, or aggravated the harmful outcome. A repressive state
may have a track record of inhumanely treating its citizens. Should an MNE provide
it with incapacitating weapons, stun guns or tasers, then it essentially facilitates the
commission of the violation.
An analysis of the ways in which a corporation may become implicated in the
commission of a human rights violation does not stop at the contributory conduct.
56 ARSIWA Commentary, 66.
57 ARSIWA Commentary, 67.
58 Commentary to the Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, ILC Report on the
work of its sixty-third session, UNGAOR 66th Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/66/10 (2011) (ARIO
Commentary), 37.
59 Nolte and Aust (2009), p. 10.
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There is a second element that has to be scrutinised, namely the subjective
element.60 Article 16 ARSIWA speaks of aid or assistance with ‘knowledge of the
circumstances of the internationally wrongful act’.61 The Commentary to Article 16
goes a step further by suggesting that ‘aid or assistance must be given with a view to
facilitating the commission of the wrongful act, and must actually do so … A State
is not responsible for aid and assistance under article 16 unless the relevant State
organ intended, by the aid or assistance given, to facilitate the occurrence of the
wrongful conduct’.62 Indeed, it is this second interpretation of the subjective
element that the Court appears to favour in its Bosnian Genocide case, where it held
that ‘the conduct of an organ or a person furnishing aid or assistance to a perpetrator
of the crime of genocide cannot be regarded as complicity unless at the least that
organ or person acted knowingly, that is to say, in particular, was aware of the
specific intent (dolus specialis) of the principal perpetrator’.63 According to Nolte
and Aust, the words ‘at the least’ used by the Court suggest that ‘as a general rule,
more than mere knowledge is required’.64
Turning anew to the MNE-state relationship, the most clear-cut, and perhaps the
most extreme, case would be that of an MNE which shares the intent of the
wrongfully acting state. A plausible scenario of this kind would involve an MNE,
which has agreed with the state that its military forces will ensure the availability of
workforce, even through forced labour. Yet, a lower, as it were, threshold might
suffice. Thus, if the MNE is aware that its conduct will most likely contribute to the
commission of human rights violations, then it could be attributed responsibility for
aiding and abetting. Such knowledge may stem from information that is publicly
available, in the form of human rights bodies’ case law or domestic cases, or from
information that has become available to the MNE from a non-governmental
organisation or a local community.
In the factual situations contemplated above, an MNE may incur derivative
responsibility for its implication in the commission of a wrongful act. In most
scenarios, the MNE will in principle be acting lawfully when it is providing
technological, logistical or financial support to a state. Yet, through its actions the
MNE kick-starts a causal relationship between itself and the aid it provides and the
commission of an internationally wrongful act by the principal wrongdoer, namely
the state. It is because of this causal relationship that the MNE incurs responsibility.
Indeed, to the extent that the subjective element of aiding and abetting responsibility
is met, then the MNE by proxy condones or even encourages the commission of an
internationally wrongful act.
60 The usual caveat would apply here, namely that corporations, or any other legal persons for that
matter, do not have a separate will or cognition facility from that of natural persons directing and
participating in their operations.
61 In this sense, the Commentary notes that: ‘If the assisting or aiding State is unaware of the
circumstances in which its aid or assistance is intended to be used by the other State, it bears no
international responsibility’. ARSIWA Commentary, 66.
62 ARSIWA Commentary, 66 (emphasis added).
63 Bosnian Genocide, p. 218, para. 421.
64 Nolte and Aust (2009), p. 14.
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Whether other rules attributing international responsibility to a state for the action
of another can be transposed to the state-MNE relationship is a different question.
One may here refer to the ARSIWA which, apart from aiding and abetting, provide
for the responsibility of a state that ‘directs or controls’ (Article 17 ARSIWA) or
‘coerces’ (Article 18 ARSIWA) another state to commit an internationally wrongful
act. These situations are admittedly premised on a different normative base. Thus, as
regards ‘control’ in the context of Article 17 ARSIWA, the ILC refers to the
‘domination over the commission of wrongful conduct and not simply the exercise of
oversight, still less mere influence or concern’,65 whereas it takes ‘direction’ to
connote ‘actual direction of an operative kind’.66 The bar is set even higher when it
comes to ‘coercion’, as it suggests that: ‘Nothing less than conduct which forces the
will of the coerced State will suffice’.67 In all these three situations, responsibility is
attributed to a state because it exercises a high level of control over another state. It is
dubious, and ultimately highly unlinkely, that an MNE can exercise such control over
a state to a degree where that state’s ‘authority over its actions’68 is eclipsed. As
noted in the introduction to this article, the concern about the MNEs’ growing
economic power has been a recurring theme in international practice. The idea is that
this economic power has the capacity to mutate into political power. Nonetheless,
irrespective of the size of the MNEs’ economic power, the latter is not commensurate
to the political power of the sovereign,69 and therefore cannot serve as a normative
basis for the attribution of responsibility.
4 Implementation of Shared Responsibility by International
and National Courts
Admittedly the complexity in international relations which flows from the
increasingly frequent cooperative endeavours between states and a plurality of
other actors does not square with the realities of international dispute settlement
procedures, or domestic ones for that matter. One would be hard pressed to find
judicial cases dealing with the allocation of responsibility to a plurality of
wrongdoers, mainly due to jurisdictional limitations. Besides, international judicial
and quasi-judicial bodies, such as human rights monitoring mechanisms, operate on
the basis of consent by the states parties to their respective constituent treaties,
which means inter alia that their jurisdiction ratione personae does not extend to
include corporations as defendants.70 Conversely, domestic courts called upon to
examine claims against MNEs for their implication in human rights abuses will not
in principle have jurisdiction to pronounce on the legality of state action, as the state
itself would not be sued. Yet, even in the unlikely instance where the state would be
65 ARSIWA Commentary, 69.
66 ARSIWA Commentary, 69.
67 ARSIWA Commentary, 69.
68 On authority over actions, see Eagleton (1928), p. 152.
69 Seidl-Hohenveldern (1986), p. 35.
70 The sole exception in this respect appears to be the LOSC deep seabed dispute settlement regime.
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sued, such action would probably fail on account of the sovereign immunity of that
state. This situation, albeit in accordance with the basic tenets of international law,
may be conceived as problematic in cases of ‘shared responsibility’ since the
jurisdictional limitations in place will prevent courts from allocating responsibility
to multiple entities.
The most prominent example of domestic case law concerning harmful outcomes
flowing from the co-operation of states and MNEs is the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)
saga concerning ‘corporate complicity’ claims brought before the United States
(US) courts.71 The ATS, which grants district courts ‘original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations
or a treaty of the United States’,72 was applied to corporations in a string of lower
court cases, which culminated in the US Supreme Court Kiobel ruling. The
petitioners in Kiobel, a group of Nigerian nationals residing in the US, alleged that
they were victims of human rights abuses taking place in the Nigerian province of
Ogoniland, and more specifically that the defendant oil corporations had aided and
abetted the Nigerian government in committing those violations. For Justice
Roberts, who delivered the Opinion, the crucial question was whether ‘a claim
[under the ATS] may reach conduct occurring in the territory of a foreign
sovereign’.73 Roberts went on to answer the question in the negative, holding that
the presumption against extraterritoriality applied to the ATS.74 The Kiobel decision
at least prima vista seems to close the door to future litigation against foreign
corporations, and for that reason it has been widely criticised.75
Irrespective of the future of ATS litigation, the existing ATS case law is
significant from a ‘shared responsibility’ perspective, as it touches upon the
contribution of MNEs to human rights abuses committed by a sovereign. In other
words, it deals with factual patterns, which could be brought to the attention of an
international body called to assess the responsibility of the state assisted in an abuse
by an MNE. Indeed, the allegations of the Ogoni population concerning the
implication of multinational oil companies in the violation of their human rights by
Nigeria, considered by the US Courts in Kiobel, were further scrutinised by the
African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights in Serac.76 Before the
Commission, it was argued that the Nigerian government, through its oil state
company acting as a majority shareholder in a consortium with Shell Petroleum
Development Company, had exploited ‘oil reserves in Ogoniland with no regard for
the health or environment of the local communities, disposing toxic wastes into the
environment and local waterways … [and as a result the] contamination of water,
soil and air has had serious short and long-term health impacts’.77
71 On the application of ATS to corporations, see Koebele (2009); Fletcher (2008).
72 Alien Tort Statute, 28 USC Section 1350 (ATS).
73 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013) (Kiobel), p. 1664.
74 Kiobel, p. 1666.
75 See Colangelo (2013), p. 1329; McCorquodale (2013).
76 Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria,
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Communication No. 155/96 (2001) (Serac).
77 Serac, para. 2.
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What sets Serac apart is the fact that the violations complained of were the result of
the actions of a consortium in which both the state and an MNE participated.
Nonetheless, the Commission’s mandate extends to the examination of the actions by
a state party to the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights (AfrCharter) and
does not include the capacity to scrutinise the actions of MNEs.78 In its analysis of
Article 4 AfrCharter on the right to life, however, the Commission noted that a
violation had indeed taken place ‘[g]iven the widespread violations perpetrated by the
Government of Nigeria and by private actors (be it following its clear blessing or
not)’.79 The Commission then went on to make an ambivalent statement regarding
MNEs. While it held that ‘the Nigerian government has given the green light to private
actors, and the oil Companies in particular, to devastatingly affect the well-being of
the Ogonis’, it also noted that ‘[t]he intervention of multinational corporations may be
a potentially positive force for development if the State and the people concerned are
ever mindful of the common good and the sacred rights of individuals and
communities’.80 Whatever the direction or provenance of the last statement, it
remains undoubted that the Commission in Seracwas faced with a situation of ‘shared
responsibility’ that it could not assess in its totality due to jurisdictional limitations.
It is argued that in cases of harmful outcomes resulting from the actions of multiple
wrongdoers, one should look beyond the jurisdictional limitations to possible
interactions between international and national dispute settlement bodies called upon
to adjudicate ‘shared responsibility’ cases arising from the same factual patterns.81 Of
course, one should not lose sight of the fact that the powers and procedures of
international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies may differ radically from those of
national courts. Furthermore, international bodies and national courts will in principle
be called upon to interpret different sets of rules. Therefore, the interaction envisaged
in this respect deviates from theories of ‘transnational judicial dialogue’.82 The key
question is not whether courts attach weight to the findings of other courts on the
content of a given primary norm but whether they should attach weight, and if so to
what purpose, whilst determining the responsibility of a particular defendant.
When it comes to domestic courts, there is a string of reasons that would militate
for their taking into consideration findings of breach by human rights courts or
treaty bodies. Especially in the context of ATS litigation, domestic courts were
faced with motions to dismiss relying on various grounds, which invariably related
to the fact that a foreign sovereign state was implicated in the litigation.83 Reliance
78 African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 27 June 1981, in force 21 October 1986, 21
ILM 58 (1982) (AfrCharter). According to Art. 56 (2) AfrCharter, communications are admissible if they
‘are compatible with the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity or with the [African] Charter’. This
has been interpreted to mean that communications against individuals will be declared inadmissible. See
Viljoen (2002), pp. 72–75.
79 Serac, para. 67.
80 Serac, paras. 58, 69.
81 See in this respect, Nollkaemper (2014a), p. 809.
82 See Waters (2004–2005); Burke-White (2004).
83 Thus, in Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289 (SDNY 2003),
Counsel for the defendants invoked the act of state doctrine, the hindrance of US foreign policy, the
political question doctrine and the failure to join an indispensable party.
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on a finding of breach by a human rights court or treaty body may counteract
separation-of-powers or comity arguments. Finally, such reliance may pave the way
for grounding the responsibility of an MNE for aiding and abetting a human rights
violation that has already been established.
Equally, there are good grounds for international dispute settlement bodies to
take into consideration decisions by domestic courts, and these predominantly
relate to the access to facts. Human rights courts and treaty bodies do not operate
in the same manner as domestic courts. Their capacity to hear oral testimony or
receive evidence will depend on the respective rules of procedure and the
willingness of the respective court or body to do so.84 Overall, it has been
suggested that whilst proceedings before international tribunals include oral
hearings, the hearings historically, and with the exception of international criminal
tribunals, did not necessarily involve the oral testimony of witnesses.85 In the light
of the above, it becomes apparent that to the extent that domestic courts issue
decisions, which set forth a detailed version of crucial facts, international courts
should accord them due consideration as evidence, since this could enable them to
have a clearer picture of the exact role of the co-responsible parties implicated in
each case.
Of course, in both cases described above, caveats apply as to the weight to be
attached to the respective findings. Neither national courts nor international bodies
will be called upon to treat the decisions of another as carved in stone, let alone as
precedent. Indeed, they should tread with caution taking into consideration that they
operate on different planes, outside a common normative framework. Courts will
have to assess the weight to be attached to a decision of another taking into
consideration the independence, the procedural fairness, as well as the standard or
burden of proof of the court in question.86
5 Alternative Conceptions of Responsibility in the Standard-Setting
Activities of the UN
As noted above, the onset of globalisation and the proliferation of reports on the
implication of MNEs in gross human rights abuses have generated efforts to submit
MNEs to international law as a means of closing the accountability gap.87 The most
recent manifestation of these efforts is the adoption by the UN Human Rights
Council of a resolution calling for the ‘elaboration of an international legally
binding instrument on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with
84 As regards the Human Rights Committee, it has been argued that ‘under the terms of the Optional
Protocol, the Committee is confined clearly to an evaluation in the light of all ‘‘written’’ information made
available to it’. Gandhi (1998), p 309. On the contrary, the African Commission of Human and Peoples’
Rights has displayed ‘a willingness to accept any form of evidence … as well as oral hearings.’ Murray
(2002), p. 102.
85 Cf. Pasqualucci (2003), p. 194.
86 For a more detailed analysis, Nollkaemper (2014a), pp. 839–846.
87 See Joseph (1999), p. 185.
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respect to human rights’.88 Still, if one were to take a macroscopic look at
international practice, one would realise that since the 1970s states have dealt with
the question of MNEs through the setting of non-binding standards.89 Especially
during the last two decades, there has been an explosion in the number of
instruments and initiatives addressed to MNEs. These initiatives are no longer
exclusively crafted by states. On the contrary, they range from codes of conduct
drafted by corporations themselves, to reporting initiatives devised by non-
governmental organisations, to guidelines adopted by international organisations.
Such an infinite variety renders any attempt at classification extremely difficult.
Nonetheless, one can point to a series of characteristic traits, which appear to set
these new initiatives apart from similar efforts in the past.
First and foremost, all initiatives and standards post-Cold War build on human rights
as the key point of reference, with the addition of environmental and anti-corruption
clauses. International human rights rules, originally drafted in the image of their
domestic public law counterparts and addressed to states, are now seen as carrying a
symbolic value which transcends societal relations, and therefore such rules are seen as
equally transposable to the context of corporate operations. Second, in recognition of
the complex relations created between states and MNEs, recent initiatives have turned
the concept of ‘corporate complicity’ into ‘the kernel of attempts to hold corporations
accountable for human rights abuses’.90 The idea of ‘complicity’ highlights the
potential for MNEs to significantly contribute to, or enhance the ability of, a state to
perpetrate gross human rights abuses. In other words, it underlines the harmful
consequences that may flow from the cooperation between states and corporations.
The analysis will focus solely on those standard-setting activities that have taken
place within the framework of the United Nations. The UN has served as a fertile
testing ground for the creation of novel types of initiatives governing the
relationship between MNEs and human rights. However, even within the UN there
has been considerable tension as to the nature and form of the initiatives. Suffice it
here to note that two schools of thought have dominated the field: those supporting a
legalisation of standards and those opting for a corporate governance approach. The
next sub-sections will seek to assess the extent to which these initiatives address the
sharing of responsibility among states and MNEs.
5.1 Introductory Lessons in Corporate Governance: the UN Global
Compact
The UN Global Compact (GC), launched in 2000, has evolved into one of the
largest corporate responsibility initiatives.91 The GC is neither ‘legally binding’, nor
88 Human Rights Council, ‘Elaboration of an international legally binding instrument on transnational
corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights’, UN Doc A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1
(25 June 2014).
89 On the history of standard-setting activities in the framework of the UN, see Sagafi-nejad (2008). On
the relevant ILO and the OECD instruments, see Muchlinski (2007), pp. 473–507.
90 Clapham (2006), p. 563.
91 According to the United Nations Global Compact website, the initiative has nowadays grown to more
than 12,000 participants, including over 8,000 businesses.
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is it a ‘code of conduct’. It is a ‘purely voluntary initiative, [that] does not police or
enforce behaviours or actions of companies. Rather it is designed to stimulate
change and to promote good corporate citizenship’. It also serves as a ‘platform—
based on universal principles—to encourage innovative initiatives and partnerships
with civil-society, governments and stakeholders’.92 It becomes apparent from the
start that the GC breaks with the traditional modes of standard-setting employed by
the United Nations.93
Participating businesses are expected to integrate the ‘Ten Principles’ into their
business strategy, their everyday operations and their decision-making processes.94
Particularly as regards human rights, businesses are called upon to ‘support and
respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights’ and to ‘make sure
that they are not complicit in human rights abuses’.95 According to the GC
Commentary, ‘[c]omplicity basically means being implicated in a human rights
abuse that another company, government, individual, group etc. is causing’.96
Complicity consists of ‘[a]n act or omission … by a company, or individual
representing the company, that ‘‘helps’’ (facilitates, legitimizes, assists, encourages,
etc.) another, in some way, to carry out a human rights abuse, and … [t]he
knowledge by the company that its act or omission could provide such help’.97
One cannot help but notice the elusiveness with which the basic tenets of the GC
are being described. Indeed, it is not entirely clear what behaviour participating
businesses are called upon to follow. Especially with regard to ‘complicity’, the GC
casts the net wider than international responsibility rules on aiding and abetting, or
international criminal law rules for that matter. This is perhaps so because of the
nature of the GC, which is not geared towards assigning any form of responsibility
for contributions to injury. Indeed, the GC does not come with an enforcement
mechanism, which is only logical in the light of the fact that it does not set forth
norms or standards to which corporations are bound.
5.2 A Turn towards Legalisation: the 2003 UN Norms
Prior to the launching of the GC, the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights had embarked upon the project of restating those
international legal principles applicable to businesses with regard to human rights,
with a view to securing corporate accountability.98 The idea behind this standard-
setting activity was summarised as follows: ‘All in all business enterprises have
increased their power in the world. International, national, state and local lawmakers
are realising that this power must be confronted, and the human rights obligations of
92 See the GC website’s section entitled ‘Frequently Asked Questions’, United Nations Global Compact
website, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/, accessed 11 February 2015 (GC website).
93 For contrasting views on the merits of the GC, see Coleman (2003), p. 339; and King (2001), p. 482.
94 See the GC website’s section entitled ‘How to participate’.
95 See Principles 1 and 2 GC.
96 See the GC website section entitled ‘Global Compact Principle Two’.
97 See the GC website section entitled ‘Global Compact Principle Two’.
98 On the drafting history of the UN Norms, see Weissbrodt and Kruger (2003), pp. 903–907.
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business enterprises, in particular, must be addressed’.99 The outcome of the Sub-
Commission’s work was the 2003 UN Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human
Rights (UN Norms).100
The UN Norms signalled a move away from the governance-oriented Global
Compact towards the re-legalisation of the business-human rights conundrum.
Indeed, the UN Norms ‘follow a standard international law format’.101 They
enunciate the basic obligation of states and MNEs vis-a`-vis human rights, then they
list those human rights rules considered as relevant to corporate conduct, and finally
they provide for implementation provisions.
Article 1 UN Norms distinguishes between states and MNEs—or TNCs as they
are referred to throughout the instrument—by positing that states ‘have the primary
responsibility to promote, secure the fulfillment of, respect, ensure respect and
protect human rights recognized in international as well as national law, including
ensuring that transnational corporations and other business enterprises respect
human rights’, whereas ‘[w]ithin their respective spheres of activity and influence,
transnational corporations and other business enterprises have the obligation to
promote, secure the fulfillment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect human
rights recognized in international as well as national law, including the rights and
interests of indigenous peoples and other vulnerable groups.’ The formulation of
this clause gives rise to a series of conceptual issues that need to be clarified. First
and foremost, states are accorded the ‘primary responsibility’ vis-a`-vis human
rights. The use of the term ‘responsibility’ in this respect does not refer to
responsibility incurred ex post facto for breaching an obligation. Rather, it is used as
a synonym for the primary human rights obligations of states. In other words, the
clause reflects the position of states as the primordial addressees of international
human rights rules. Second, transnational corporations shoulder the ‘obligation’ to
uphold human rights.
When it comes to outlining the content of this ‘obligation’, the Commentary to
Article 1 suggests that corporations ‘shall have the responsibility to use due
diligence in ensuring that their activities do not contribute directly or indirectly to
human rights abuses, and that they do not directly or indirectly benefit from abuses
of which they were aware or ought to have been aware’.102 The analysis in the
Commentary thus suggests that, apart from the primary human rights obligations of
corporations spelled out in the UN Norms, corporations may also be held
responsible for aiding and abetting. Whilst the Commentary impliedly recognises
that complicity entails a material and a subjective element, what the threshold is
remains unclear.
99 Weissbrodt and Kruger (2003), p. 902.
100 Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with
Regard to Human Rights and Commentary, UN Doc. E/Cn.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2 (26 August 2003) (UN
Norms).
101 Kinley and Chambers (2006), p. 451.
102 See Commentary (b) to Art. 1 of the UN Norms.
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Apart from complicity, the concept of ‘sphere of activity and influence’ further
corroborates the suggestion that the UN Norms’ drafters contemplated situations of
‘shared responsibility’ that could flow from the co-operation between—and by
implication of the parallel exercise of power on behalf of—states and MNEs. The
problem is that the concept does not come with a ‘legal pedigree’.103 Indeed, the
vagueness of the ‘sphere of influence’ concept, coupled with the silence of the
Commentary to the UN Norms in this respect, generated criticism from states and
corporations.104 One can only theorise as to whether the ‘sphere of influence’ was
intended to serve as a means of delimitating the content of the primary obligations
of corporations, or as a yardstick to allocate responsibility. Irrespective of this,
however, the assumption behind the ‘spheres of influence’ remains that to the extent
that a harmful outcome is the result of conduct within the MNE’s ‘sphere of activity
and influence’, then such conduct may lead to that MNE’s responsibility. Perhaps
the use of the term ‘influence’ may suggest that the MNE is not seen as capable of
exercising ‘control’, which may in turn always rest with the state. Yet, that does not
mean that the MNE would be absolved from responsibility under the UN Norms in
respect of its action vis-a`-vis for example its employees, over which it exercises
‘influence’ on the basis of the contractual bond between the two.
Much ink has been spilt regarding the merits and deficiencies of the UN Norms,
yet what is beyond dispute is their ‘enunciative audacity’ and their ‘zero
tolerance’,105 which led to their demise. Their adoption by the Sub-Commission
was their high mark, as in a subsequent resolution the Commission on Human
Rights suggested that the UN Norms had no legal standing,106 a conclusion echoed
by states throughout a consultation held on the UN Norms under the auspices of the
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.107
5.3 Striking a Pragmatic Approach: the United Nations Guiding Principles
on Business and Human Rights
In the aftermath of states’ expressed hostility towards the UN Norms, John Ruggie,
a key figure in the design of the Global Compact, was appointed as the UN
Secretary-General’s Special Representative on Human Rights and Transnational
Corporations. Ruggie sailed clear past the legalisation of the debate opted for by the
drafters of the UN Norms, towards a middle of the road approach: MNEs were
neither seen as direct addressees of international human rights law, nor at the same
time operating in a legal vacuum.108 Throughout his mandate he designed a
103 Ruggie (2007), p. 825.
104 Kinley et al. (2007), p. 37.
105 Baxi (2005), pp. 2–3.
106 Responsibilities of transnational corporations and related business enterprises with regard to human
rights, CHR 2004/116 (22 April 2004), UN Doc. E/CN.4/DEC/2004/116.
107 For an analysis of states’ submissions to this consultation, see Karavias (2013), pp. 78–81.
108 Ruggie has voiced his disagreement with the choice of the drafters of the UN Norms ‘to take existing
State-based human rights instruments and simply assert that many of their provisions now are binding on
corporations as well… [t]hat assertion itself has little authoritative basis in international law—hard, soft,
or otherwise’. Notwithstanding, he noted that ‘emerging practice and expert opinion increasingly do
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tripartite framework, entitled ‘Protect, Respect, Remedy’, which is premised on
three core principles: (a) the state duty to protect human rights; (b) the corporate
responsibility to respect human rights; and (c) the need for more effective access to
remedies.109 The ‘corporate responsibility to respect human rights’ is a ‘baseline
responsibility’ which operates ‘in addition to compliance with national law’ and
whose scope is ‘defined by social expectations’.110 The use of the term
‘responsibility’ as opposed to ‘duty’ ‘is meant to indicate that respecting human
rights is not an obligation that current international human rights law generally
imposes on companies, although elements may be reflected in domestic laws’.111
The fundamental concepts of the ‘Protect, Respect, Remedy’ framework
provided the groundwork for the drafting of the ‘UN Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights’.112 According to Principle 11: ‘Business enterprises
should respect human rights. This means that they should avoid infringing on the
human rights of others and should address adverse human rights impacts with which
they are involved.’113 Furthermore, the corporate responsibility to respect human
rights requires business enterprises to ‘[a]void causing or contributing to adverse
human rights impacts through their own activities, and address such impacts where
they occur’ (Principle 13). In order to ‘identify, prevent, mitigate and account for
how they address their adverse human rights impacts’, business are called upon to
‘carry out human rights due diligence’ which includes assessing the impacts,
integrating and acting upon the findings and communicating how impacts are
addressed (Principle 17).
This ‘human rights due diligence’ is the key to operationalising the Guiding
Principles. The potential impact of corporations on human rights is perceived as a
‘risk’, which can be addressed through ‘prevention or mitigation’, whereas the
actual impact ‘should be a subject of remediation’.114 Due diligence thus
predominantly serves as a risk management tool, which when employed correctly
can help businesses address human rights claims by demonstrating that ‘they took
Footnote 108 continued
suggest that corporations may be held liable for committing, or for complicity in, the most heinous human
rights violations amounting to international crimes’. See Ruggie J, ‘Interim Report of the Special Rep-
resentative of the Secretary-General on the Issues of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and
Other Business Enterprises’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/97 (22 February 2006), paras. 60 and 69.
109 See Ruggie J, ‘Protect, Respect, Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights’, UN Doc.
A/HRC/8/5 (7 April 2008).
110 Ruggie (2008), supra n. 109, paras. 54, 55.
111 Ruggie J, ‘Business and Human Rights: Further Steps towards the Operationalization of the ‘‘Protect,
Respect and Remedy’’ Framework’, UN Doc. A/HRC/14/27 (9 April 2010), para. 55.
112 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and Commentary, Implementing the United
Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, HR/PUB/11/04 (United Nations, 2011) (Guiding
Principles). The Guiding Principles were endorsed by the Human Rights Council, ‘Human rights and
transnational corporations and other business enterprises’, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/4 (6 July 2011).
113 It is important to note that the Commentary to Principle 11 of the Guiding Principles fleshes out a
‘savings clause’ in suggesting that the ‘corporate responsibility to respect human rights’ exists
‘independently of States’ abilities and/or willingness to fulfil they own human rights obligations, and does
not diminish those obligations’.
114 Guiding Principles, p. 18.
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every reasonable step to avoid involvement with a human rights abuse’.115 This
form of due diligence does not speak to the content of a primary human rights norm
binding on the corporation. On the contrary, ‘due diligence’ in the framework of the
Guiding Principles has multiple functions: it ‘serves an executive function,
providing the information necessary for determining corporate action … as a
monitoring device—available for use by both internal and external stakeholders—to
make accountability more efficient … [as] a fact-finding and remediation function
providing the basis for both the process and substantive content of resolving the
consequences of human rights affecting actions’.116 The reference to ‘due diligence’
in a governance instrument, though, should not be seen as devoid of legal
implications. As has been argued, the Guiding Principles may lead, through their
reliance on ‘due diligence’, to the crystallisation of ‘a binding duty of care towards
foreseeable potential victims of human rights infringements arising out of
investment projects’.117 Ultimately, the Guiding Principles are not grounded in a
conception of responsibility as an ex post facto operation aimed at remedying the
consequences of wrongful acts, but rather as an ex ante effort to establish standards
of good corporate conduct that may contribute to the prevention of harmful
outcomes.
6 Conclusion
It has been argued that ‘[m]ultinational enterprises create… huge complications for
traditional international legal concepts’.118 The heated debates that have consis-
tently plagued efforts to create a binding legal instrument in relation to the operation
of MNEs, and specifically its impact on the enjoyment by individuals of their human
rights, attest to the veracity of this statement. Nonetheless, this should not be taken
to mean that the operation of MNEs falls squarely outside the ambit of existing
international rules. Indeed, as the present analysis has showed, international law
rules, and more specifically the rules on international responsibility, may be called
into application in relation to MNEs. Thus, the conduct of a subsidiary of an MNE
may be attributed both to the home and host state on the basis of the attribution rules
enshrined by the ILC in its ARSIWA. Whether there exists ‘shared responsibility’
between the host state and the corporation itself is a thornier question. Any finding
of responsibility under international law of the corporation eo nomine ultimately
hinges on the affirmation of primary international obligations binding on that
corporation qua legal person. Putting this matter aside, certain rules of state
responsibility, such as the rule on aid and assistance, could be transposed to the
state-MNE context. One could then suggest that the rules of international
responsibility exhibit a certain measure of flexibility that allows them to capture
complex legal situations involving non-state actors.
115 Guiding Principles, p. 19.
116 Backer (2012), p. 158.
117 Muchlinski (2012), p. 167.
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Still, judicial practice in respect of ‘shared responsibility’ scenarios between
states and MNEs is lacking. The US courts have been called upon to pronounce on
the legality of corporate conduct abroad, without entering the fray as regards the
legality of the conduct of the state, in which the corporation operates. Conversely,
international treaty bodies and international courts have addressed the responsibility
of states for human rights violations flowing from corporate conduct. Whereas
current jurisdictional limitations both on the domestic and international level may
render a finding of ‘shared responsibility’ of a state and an MNE improbable, one
can identify potential positive synergies between the two levels of adjudication, e.g.
in respect of available evidence.
The dearth of judicial findings by no means connotes the lack of international
practice. On the contrary, the last two decades have witnessed a proliferation of
MNE-related instruments negotiated within and outside the framework of interna-
tional organisations. These initiatives open up a vista of various conceptions of
responsibility. Indeed, the responsibility of MNEs is nowadays not solely understood
in an ex post facto sense concerning the legal consequences attached to the
perpetration of a harmful act, but also in an ex ante one. Thus, instruments such as the
Global Compact and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
employ the term ‘responsibility’ to signify the duty of MNEs to take proactive
measures in order to avoid being implicated in harmful outcomes. Responsibility
thus does not serve its traditional remedial role, but manifests itself as a risk
management tool. Interestingly, this conception of responsibility is not solely
addressed at MNEs but also states. Both entities should strive to take the measures
necessary in order to prevent their implication in human rights abuses. Of course, this
form of ‘shared responsibility’ is open to criticism from those who firmly believe that
the only credible deterrent is for states and MNEs to be held responsible in law and
provide reparation when they contribute to a harmful outcome proscribed by
international law. Nonetheless, the conception of ‘shared responsibility’ does not
exclude or vitiate the other. On the contrary, the accountability gap may be addressed
more efficiently if both conceptions exist and operate in parallel.
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